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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
Standing in the way, however, of the success of the Uniform Commission-
ers in their efforts to preserve this established common law doctrine is the
fact that the present Bank Collection Code has already been adopted by 18
states, and it is not likely that these states will readily consent to another
such radical change in their banking laws. So looking to the future, and
assuming the completion of the Uniform Act now pending, it seems likely
that the American states will again be divided into two groups on this ques-
tion, such as they were when the present common law rule was being de-
veloped. Those having adopted the Bank Collection Code sponsored by the
American Bankers Ass'n will no doubt follow the principal Missouri case
and recognize the agency relationship; and those which choose to adopt the
act proposed by the members of the Uniform State Laws Commission, along
with those which do not adopt either code, will retain the present common
law view, which treats the bank as a purchaser of the paper. Thus these
attempts at uniformity will probably not only result in a failure of their
ultimate purpose, but will on the contrary create an even greater conflict
than existed prior to the enactment of this legislation. I. J. W., '35.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-EMINENT DOMAIN-GOLD REQUISITIONING-The
recovery legislation gradually begins to reap a judicial harvest. A
recent case continues the already notable tendency to furnish old legal im-
plements in support of the present labor. On an indictment in two counts
for failure to comply with executive order of August 28, 1933, demanding
returns to be made regarding gold held in possession, and that of April 5,
1933, requisitioning such supplies, held, the first order is a valid exercise of
the currency powers of the national government. The requisitioning order
was pronounced invalid because promulgated by the President and not by the
Secretary of the Treasury, as provided by the statute. The court, however,
seized the opportunity to elaborate a lengthy dictum justifying the requisi-
tion on the basis of eminent domain. United States v. Campbell (D. C. S. D.
N. Y. 1933) 5 Fed. Supp. 156.
The power of Congress to regulate gold is a corollary of its generously
defined currency control. Const. art. 1, sec. 8, clauses 2, 5, 18: Veazie Bank
v. Fenno (1869) 8 Wall. 533; Legal Tender Cases (1870) 12 Wall. 457;
Juilliard v. Greenman (1884) 110 U. S. 421. In a somewhat analogous case
the Phillipine legislature, acting under authority delegated by Congress, was
held validly to have prohibited the export of Phillipine silver coin. Ling Su
Fan v. United States (1910) 218 U. S. 302.
In applying the doctrine of eminent domain to the requisitioning of gold
certain superficial difficulties are entailed. In time of war the sphere Of
governmental requisition is practically unlimited. The Lever Act for Food
Control (1917)40 Stat. 276. The court in the instant case, however, bases
its justification rather on the essential nature of eminent domain than on any
attempted analogy between the present predicament and a state of war.
The cases are permeated with dicta extending the rule to all forms of property
whether personal or real. United States v. Lynah (1903) 188 U. S. 445, at
p. 465. Actually, however, the occasions on which property other than real
has been appropriated are relatively few; although, when such have pre-
sented themselves the courts have not been loath to apply the doctrine. Patent
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rights have been taken by eminent domain, James v. Campbell (1881) 104
U. S. 356; Brady v. Atlantic Works (C. C. Mass. 1876) 3 Fed. Cas. 1190;
franchises, Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States (1892) 148 U. S.
312; and even minority shares of stock in a railway corporation, Ofield V.
N. Y. Ry. Co. (1906) 203 U. S. 372. Gold, as a commodity, would appear to
be well within the scope of the rule. Several cases, however, contain the
somewhat forbidding dictum that money cannot be made the subject of
governmental appropriation. Cary Library v. Bliss (1890) 151 Mass. 364,
25 N. E. 92; Burnett v. City of Sacramento (1859) 12 Cal. 76, at 84; I Nichols
on Eminent-Domain (2d ed. 1917) p. 69. The rationale advanced is, that since
compensation itself must be made in money, usually payable in advance, any
attempt to confiscate money must end in a logical impasse; also that the
requisitioning of money is the function of taxation. People V. Mayor of
Brooklyn (1851) 4 N. Y. 419, at 424. The first objection is rendered purely
academical, for one thing, by the fact that Congress need not compensate at
the time of the taking. Campbell v. Uited States (1924) 266 U. S. 368. In
the light of the purpose of the present taking the second argument has little
pertinency.
The question of compensation is slightly more difficult. The measure is
the fair market value at time of taking. Boom Co. v. Patterson (1878) 98
U. S. 403. The owner is entitled to a "full and perfect equivalent of the
property taken." Seaboard Air Line By. v. United States (1923) 261 U. S.
299. The instant case presents an anomalous situation; for, if we assume the
power of the government to regulate gold as an adjunct of its control over the
currency, compensation is dictated entirely by the government, since the
value of gold is obviously confined to what the government declares it to be.
Thus compensation under the theory of eminent domain is largely shorn of
its essential effect. The requisition might more logically be based purely
upon the police power. C. B. P., '35.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-IMPAIRMENT OF THE OBLIGATION OF CONTRACT-
EMERGENCY LEGISLATION.-Chapter 339 of the Laws of Minnesota of 1933,
p. 514, called the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Law, provides that, during
the emergency declared to exist, relief may be had with respect to foreclosures
of mortgages; that sales may be postponed and periods of redemption may
be extended. Pursuant to the statute the plaintiff applied to the court for
an order extending the period of redemption from a foreclosure sale. A judg-
ment in favor of the plaintiff was sustained by the state supreme court (249
N. W. 893). The constitutionality of the statute was upheld on the ground
of emergency although it was conceded that the obligations of the mortgage
contract were impaired. Held: The statute does not impair the obligation
of contract nor violate the due process or equal protection clauses. Home
Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell (1934) 54 S. Ct. 231.
Innumerable cases have arisen under the contract clause of the United
States Constitution. They cannot be said definitely and clearly to have stated
the principle expressed in that clause. It is rather true that they have re-
stricted its application to a considerable agree. The fact that a state is a
party to the contract does not prevent the application of the clause. Fletcher
v. Peck (1810) 6 Cranch 87. Limitations have, however, been imposed. One
of the most important is that grants by states are to be construed strictly.
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